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ABSTRACT: In this paper I argue that the work of the unorthodox Stoic Posidonius 
– as reported to us by Galen – can be seen as making an interesting contribu-
tion to contemporary debates about the nature of emotion. Richard Sorabji has 
already argued that Posidonius’ contribution highlights the weaknesses in some 
well-known contemporary forms of cognitivism. Here I argue that Posidonius 
might be seen as advocating a theory of the emotions which sees them as being, 
in at least some cases, two-level intentional phenomena. One level involves judg-
ments, just as the orthodox Stoic account does. But Posidonius thinks that emo-
tions must also include an element sometimes translated as an “irrational tug”. I 
suggest that we see the “irrational tug” as involving a second level of intentional, 
but non-conceptual representation. This view satisfies two desiderata: it is a view 
which would have been available to Posidonius and which is compatible with the 
views reported to us; and it is a view which is independently attractive. It also 
makes Posidonius’ position less far removed from that of orthodox Stoics than it 
might otherwise do, while remaining genuinely innovative.
KEY WORDS: Emotions, Galen, “irrational tug”, non-conceptual content, Posidonius.
I Introduction 
Analytic philosophers of mind rarely look to the history of philosophy – let 
alone to ancient philosophy – for inspiration. When they do, the links that 
they find between contemporary views and their historical predecessors 
tend to be ones which exist at a high level of generality. Contemporary 
philosophy of mind, properly informed by the deliverances of cognitive 
psychology and the neurosciences, is seen as completing the details of a 
picture which is at best vaguely sketched and at worst partially discernible 
beneath a wealth of dispensable, if engrossing detail mistakenly filled in 
by our illustrious predecessors.
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However, if there is any area of the philosophy of mind to which this 
characterization is unfair, it is the philosophy of emotion. Over the past 
thirty to forty years, philosophical orthodoxy has been in favour of what 
might, broadly, be called cognitive theories of emotion, and those who 
have defended them have looked to a variety of sources: not only twen-
tieth-century writers such as Wittgenstein and Sartre,1 but also notably 
Aquinas and Aristotle.2 More recently, Martha Nussbaum (1994, 2002) 
and Richard Sorabji (2000) have argued, in works that seek an audience 
beyond the narrow circles of Hellenistic philosophical scholarship, that 
the most sophisticated and most defensible forms of such a theory (as well 
as the most uncompromising) were developed by the Stoics, most notably 
by Chrysippus.3 These claims are advanced and defended not by reference 
to general programmatic statements but by means of detailed point-by-
point argumentation of a sort that aspires to live up to the standards of 
rigour of the best analytic philosophy.
Nevertheless, even within the philosophy of emotion the tide has be-
gun to turn. Cognitive theories of emotion have come under attack from 
several directions, with one critic going so far as to claim that the cognitiv-
ist research program in the philosophy of emotion is “bankrupt” (Griffiths 
1997: chapter 2). If this is so, then one might think that the contribution of 
scholars working in the history of philosophy to the development of the 
contemporary debate either to diminish greatly or to alter drastically.
I shall argue that this conclusion is too hasty. My case will rest on 
a careful examination of the views of the unorthodox Stoic philosopher, 
Posidonius (as reported to us by Galen).4 I shall be claiming that Posido-
1 Notably Solomon (1973), Kenny (1963).
2 Kenny (1963), Lyons (1980).
3 Nussbaum (1994: chapters 9–10), Sorabji (2000: chapters 2, 11 and 12).
4 A brief note on sources is in order here. Our main source for Posidonius’ views of 
emotion is Galen (1981), which I refer to repeatedly throughout. The importance of Ga-
len’s evidence for our knowledge of this aspect of Posidonius’ views can be appreciated by 
examining Kidd’s edition of Posidonius. In this, the standard scholarly edition, the over-
whelming majority of texts on the emotions which Kidd gives are taken from this work of 
Galen’s. Furthermore, as Sorabji (2000) has pointed out, there are good reasons for con-
sulting Galen’s text directly rather than just the excerpts from it presented by Kidd (and, 
a fortiori, in such anthologies as those by Inwood and Long and Sedley, which present an 
even more restricted selection). One is that Kidd only includes what he takes to be direct 
quotations from Posidonius in his edition. But, as Sorabji remarks, Galen often reports a 
view which, from the context we can see that he takes to be Posidonius’. A second is that 
Galen’s reporting of Posidonius’ views often enables us to place them in argumentative 
context that helps us to make sense of them, in a way in which Kidd’s thematic organisa-
tion of his remarks does not. Of course we need to concede that Galen’s use of Posidonius 
is polemical in intent and that in places he may misrepresent Posidonius’ views for his own 
purposes. But this is a problem we have to face up to in understanding Posidonius’ views 
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nius gives us important pointers towards an interesting post-cognitivist 
conception of emotion. In particular, I shall claim that Posidonius’ argu-
ments point us strongly in the direction of recognising that standard cases 
of emotion have two kinds of intentional content – one consisting of judg-
ments and another which one might call sub-judgmental. I shall also ar-
gue that this distinction between judgmental and sub-judgmental contents 
lines up well with a more modern distinction between conceptual and non-
conceptual content.5
If I am right, Posidonius can be seen as giving us good reasons for 
thinking that emotions have both conceptual and non-conceptual content. 
Although this view of emotions has not often been advocated in print,6 it 
has much to be said for it, for it enables us to retain many of the attractive 
features of the orthodox cognitivist account of the emotions while accom-
modating some of the most significant criticisms it faces.
II Cognitivism in Contemporary 
Philosophy of Emotion And Its Critics
I shall start by giving a brief characterization of cognitivism, in both its 
contemporary and Chrysippean guises. However, opinions vary as to ex-
actly what it takes for an account of emotions to qualify as cognitivist. To 
ensure that my account of the problems which cognitivism faces is not 
vitiated by insisting on an excessively demanding answer to that question, 
I aim to make this characterization as broad as possible.
in any case: even if Galen was more scrupulous in quoting Posidonius than in expounding 
what he takes to have been his views – and of course selective quotation of an author’s 
views can, on occasion, be just as misleading as unsympathetic reports. (See Section IV 
for further discussion. Those who still feel unhappy with attributing the views presented 
as Posidonius’ by Galen as Posidonius’ own should perhaps mentally substitute the phrase 
“the view to be found in Galen’s text” for the phrase “Posidonius view” at appropriate 
moments.)
5 My interest in Posidonius was initially sparked by Sorabji (2000), and my under-
standing of his views has been influenced at almost every point by my reading of both 
Sorabji (1999) and Sorabji (2000), and in particular the suggestion that Posidonius’ views 
point up the limitations of contemporary cogntivism. I claim no originality for these aspects 
of my view. However, the suggestion that Posidonius should be seen as arguing for the view 
that the contents of some emotions are non-conceptual has not previously been defended.
6 But see Charland (1995) for what he calls a two-level view of emotions, which has 
something in common with the view which I argue for here. The main difference between 
Charland’s view and my own is that he is interested in a distinction between representa-
tions which are informationally encapsulated and those which are not rather than a distinc-
tion between representations which are conceptual and those which are non-conceptual. 
But it is possible (though it would take further argument to show it) that these two distinc-
tions align with one another. 
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I shall count a view as cognitivist if it takes emotions to be identi-
cal with, or partially constituted by intentional states, some of which 
can be assessed as rational or irrational. The paradigmatic example of a 
cognitive view is one which identifies a given emotion with a particular 
judgment. For example, fear might simply be identified with the judg-
ment
D:  “danger is present”7
But a cognitivist might also hold that judgments like D are only one 
component (albeit a necessary component) of emotions. Other components 
may include feelings of pleasure and pain (Greenspan 1984, 1987); bod-
ily sensations (Lyons 1980); further judgments (Nussbaum 1994, 2002); 
and so forth. They might also avoid commitment to the view that emo-
tions involve judgments by arguing that emotions are wholly or partially 
constituted by some other kind of intentional state or states: beliefs (Solo-
mon 1973), thoughts (Stocker 1987), complexes of beliefs and desires, or 
perceptual or quasi-perceptual states (de Sousa 1987).8 Typically some 
of these states will be propositional attitudes, and in particular proposi-
tional attitudes which are apt for assessment as true or false or along some 
closely related dimension.9
Whatever class of intentional mental state the advocate of a particular 
version of cognitivism view takes the constituents to be members of, she 
may further refine her view by insisting that only some examples of that 
kind of state can be constituents of emotions. Thus emotions may be iden-
tified not with judgments with a particular content, but with particularly 
vivid judgments with the appropriate content,10 and similarly for other 
kinds of mental state.
 7 One person who seems to advocate something like this view is Robert Solomon. 
It also seems to be close to the view that Nussbaum (Nussbaum 1994; Nussbaum 2002: 
chapter 9) attributes to Chrysippus – although there are reasons for doubting that this is in 
fact his view: see Sorabji 2000: chapter 2 and below section IV for discussion).
 8 Any full-blown attempt to argue that a view of this sort is preferable to the baldest 
forms of cognitivism will of course require an argument that judgments, thoughts, percep-
tual states and so on are different kinds of items from beliefs. Depending on the type of 
state involved different strategies will be available – and have been adopted by different 
authors. Space does not permit a full review of all of them: for my (purely expository) pur-
poses it is sufficient to observe that we do manage to distinguish between these different 
sorts of states for practical purposes – if only in a fairly rough and ready way. 
 9 On de Sousa’s account each type of emotion has a formal object which provides a 
norm for the belief, in the same way that truth provides a norm for belief and goodness a 
norm for desire.
10 Nussbaum (1994), (2002) suggests this as one line that might be open to a cogni-
tivist.
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Cognitive accounts of emotion are often thought to neglect or to give 
implausible accounts of the phenomenology of emotion.11 This may not 
be a fair charge against all versions of cognitivism: those variants of the 
view which equate emotions with complexes of judgments and sensations 
can easily make room for the idea that emotions have a distinctive phe-
nomenology. And even accounts of emotion which equate them with judg-
ments or complexes of judgments need not have problems with the idea 
that emotions have a distinctive phenomenology: much here will depend 
on which particular class of judgments emotions are to be equated with, 
and on one’s views on whether judgments have a distinctive phenome-
nology.12
A second problem for cognitivist theories of emotion arises from the 
link that they seem to suggest between the possession of conceptual ca-
pacities and the ability to have emotions. By accepting that emotions are 
apt for rational assessment, and by identifying them with, or taking them 
to be composed of such items as judgments, beliefs, thoughts and the like, 
proponents of cognitivist views often seem committed to thinking that 
possession of certain concepts is a necessary precondition of having emo-
tions. It is arguable that one cannot judge, believe or think that one is in 
danger without having the concept of danger. So if a judgment, belief or 
thought that one is in danger is essential to the emotion of fear, then if one 
lacks the concept of danger then one does not have the capacity to fear.
Exactly how much of a constraint this puts on the types of creature that 
can have emotions will depend on what is involved in having concepts. 
Some views are fairly undemanding here. If having a concept involves 
nothing more than a capacity to classify presented instances of the concept 
together, or to respond in a particular way to stimuli of a particular sort, 
then it will not be too problematic to think of animals or young children 
as having concepts, and hence as being potential subjects of emotions. 13 
But if more is required – if, for example, having concepts involves having 
a capacity to find certain inferences compelling (or more demandingly, to 
find them compelling in virtue of their form)14 then the idea that children 
11 In this paragraph and those that follows I use the term “phenomenology” to refer 
to those aspects of emotions which account for the way in which emotions feel to their 
possessors. Despite its drawbacks – most obviously its failure to cohere with the usage of 
many philosophers who style themselves as phenomenologists within the Husserlian tradi-
tion, this usage is more or less standard among analytic philosophers of mind.
12 Neglected within much analytic philosophy at least. Nussbaum argues that (some) 
judgments do have a distinctive phenomenology, so that there is no problem here for the 
sort of cognitivism that she is attracted to.
13 This seems to be Nussbaum’s view in her (2002).
14 As Peacocke (1992) suggests.
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or young animals have emotions – in the full-blooded sense in which ma-
ture human beings do – will be correspondingly more problematic.
A third problem faced by contemporary cognitivist accounts of emo-
tions arises from the difficulty of specifying exactly which judgments are 
involved in particular emotions. As Michael Stocker has argued, it is very 
easy to find examples of individuals who experience emotions in situa-
tions where the judgment which we would normally expect to go with that 
emotion is absent (Stocker 1987). Consider someone who has a phobia 
about spiders. Although they are well aware that spiders are not usually a 
source of danger, this does not prevent them from being afraid. 
Stocker solves this problem by suggesting that a cognitive theorist 
of emotion should identify emotions with a kind of thought rather than 
with an all-out judgment. The idea here is that one may have all sorts of 
thoughts about a situation which one would not, on balance, endorse. But 
while the distinction which Stocker appeals to here seems well-founded, 
and to solve this particular problem for the cognitivist, in the long run it 
does little more than move the bump under the carpet.15
The cognitivist should clearly not attempt an identification of emo-
tions with thoughts simpliciter. For it is plausible that one might have the 
thought that one was in danger without being afraid (as for example in 
the case of an experienced rock climber starting on a difficult traverse). 
Similar things might be said about other specification of the content of 
the thoughts which are supposed to be identical with emotions. One can 
avoid this problem by saying that the thought has to occur to one in a par-
ticular kind of way (engaged rather than dispassionate, say). But it is not 
immediately obvious that this can be done in a way that is neither ad hoc 
nor circular.16
Martha Nussbaum (2002) has suggested a different response. As she 
points out, the case of the phobic who knows (and hence judges) that spi-
15 Notice that I am not denying (as at least one reader has suggested) that there is a 
significant difference between judgments and thoughts, nor that a cognitivist might gain 
some ground by appealing to it. The point is rather that appealing to this distinction should 
not exempt him/her from the obligation of specifying exactly which cognitive states (be 
they thoughts or judgments) are involved in emotions. Doing this will require two things: 
first of all, a specification of the contents of those states; and second, an explanation of 
how the states which have those contents differ from other states with the same content 
which would not constitute an emotion. The problem for Stocker is that, just as one might 
believe oneself to be in danger without being afraid, the thought that one was in danger 
might occur to one without one’s being afraid.
16 In effect I shall be arguing that this can be done provided we appeal to the right 
kind of resources – but those resources are not ones which Stocker provides us with. See 
Griffiths (1997) for a similar sort of suggestion about Stocker – although he and I differ on 
the question of exactly which resources are required.
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ders are not dangerous but who is still afraid of spiders only poses a prob-
lem to someone who equates emotions with judgments on the supposition 
that judgments cannot conflict with one another. But we frequently do 
make judgments that conflict with one another: weakness of will provides 
us with one sort of example; uncertainty provides us with another. There 
may be problems with understanding how this can be so,17 and the fact 
that it is so shows that we fall short of a certain kind of cognitive ideal. 
Still, no-one should doubt that it is so.
This response may seem plausible at first, since it appeals to a fairly 
common psychological phenomenon. However, one might think that it is 
ad hoc. Suppose a cognitive theorist suggests that an emotion of a certain 
kind is constituted by judgments to the effect that p. One might argue 
against this suggestion by providing prima facie cases of people who do 
not judge that p while still experiencing the emotion in question. Normally 
we take the fact that someone judges that p is not the case as evidence that 
they do not judge that p, since people do not normally make contradictory 
judgments. Now the cognitive theorist says that this not good evidence in 
this case, since when they are in the grip of strong emotions, people often 
make contradictory judgments. This does not seem a particularly com-
pelling response as it stands – although it might be improved if it could 
be embedded in a more general theory of the circumstances under which 
people make contradictory judgments.
The cognitivist should also be wary of the appeal to the possibility 
of contradictory judgments because it makes it hard to decide how one 
might decide between two alternative specifications of a cognitive account 
– in other words between two alternative specifications of precisely which 
judgments are involved in the case of a specific emotion such as fear. Much 
of the evidence that we would want to appeal to here has been effectively 
ruled out of court. So even someone who is sympathetic to a cognitive ac-
count of emotion ought to resist Nussbaum’s move. Or at least, they should 
do so if they hope that the cognitive account will give us some insight into 
the workings of specific emotions. And this hope seems reasonable: other 
things being equal, a cognitive account ought to be one that tells us some-
thing about which particular judgments are involved in a given emotion.
III Chrysippus: A Stoic Cognitivist
Richard Sorabji (1999, 2000) has recently argued that the accounts of emo-
tions proposed by the Stoics Chrysippus and Posidonius are superior in 
17 For a good introduction to the literature on weakness of will see Charlton (1988).
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various ways to those put forward by contemporary cognitivists. In what 
follows, I shall argue that Sorabji has fact understated the significance of 
Posidonius’ contribution. However, I shall start by commenting on his ac-
count of Chrysippus.18
According to Sorabji, Chrysippus holds that emotions involve two 
separate judgments: the first that some good or ill is at hand and the se-
cond that some form of reaction is appropriate. Like Sorabji, we can take 
anger as an example here. It is common to many cognitive accounts of 
emotion that anger involves a judgment to the effect that one has suffered 
some sort of undeserved harm. Chrysippus’ view is distinctive because he 
thinks that anger also involves a second sort of judgment to the effect that 
retaliation is appropriate. If either of these judgments is missing the state 
in question is not one of anger.19
As Sorabji observes, this account has two virtues. First, it is admi-
rably specific about the sorts of judgment that are involved in emotions. 
Secondly, it neatly avoids one sort of counter-example to which some ver-
sions of the cognitive account fall victim: those in which somebody makes 
a judgment about some good or ill, but in which it is plausible to say 
that they do not experience a particular type of emotion. For example, it 
deals well with the case of the experienced mountaineer who does not feel 
afraid while climbing a mountain, while continuing to appreciate that the 
activity she is involved in is very dangerous.20
18 A similar account is given in Graver (2007). For a rather different view see Frede 
(1986). Since my main concern here is with Posidonius’ views rather than Chrysippus’, I 
do not enter into interpretative controversies about the latter’s views here, beyond noting 
that Frede’s view seems to have found few adherents. 
19 In some ways the example is not ideal since Sorabji goes on to add that on Chry-
sippus’ view in many cases the reaction which is judged to be appropriate is some kind 
of “expansion” or “contraction” and to argue that such “contractions” and “expansions” 
are physiological changes in the agent. This raises the question – which he addresses only 
briefly – of what it might mean to judge a physiological change to be appropriate to the 
presence of some good or bad, commenting only that the suggestion is phenomenologi-
cally plausible: we do in fact often feel, say, sinking feelings in response to some perceived 
setback, and we do often take them to be appropriate or inappropriate.
20 A further possible virtue of the view is that although it does not directly explain 
the phenomenology of emotions it gives us some explanation of why we are strongly 
inclined to think that emotions have a phenomenological side. At any rate this is the case 
if we accept the suggestion that the reactions we judge to be appropriate or inappropriate 
are physiological ones – for presumably the physiological change will actually be one that 
occurs in case where we think that it is appropriate. Of course, on this view the expansion 
or contraction is not part of the emotion, so strictly speaking it is not the emotion itself to 
which the phenomenology belongs. But it is at least arguable that the most that one can 
non-question-beggingly insist needs to be explained is why we typically associate certain 
phenomenology with particular emotions.
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On the other hand, as Sorabji notes, the Chrysippean view does not 
deal well with a range of cases where it is plausible to say that we have 
an emotion when one or other of the two Chrysippean judgments – and 
in particular the judgment that some good or ill is at hand – is absent. 
Among such cases are our emotional responses to music and fiction, and 
Stocker’ s case of the arachnophobe discussed in section 1. Nor, given 
standard Stoic assumptions about the sorts of minds that are capable of 
forming judgments – does it deal well with the emotions of animals and 
young children. Since – on orthodox Stoic views – they cannot form judg-
ments, because they do not have reason, they cannot be subject to emo-
tions, strictly so-called.
IV Posidonius: Stoicism without Cognitivism
As Sorabji emphasizes, Chrysippus presents us with a version of a cogni-
tive theory of emotion that is admirably specific about the sorts of judg-
ments which are supposed to be involved in emotions. Unfortunately, it 
faces problems which cannot be solved without either watering down its 
precision, or retreating from the full-blown, and typically Stoic view that 
emotions are judgments.
Sorabji suggests that a plausible response to some of the problems in 
Chrysippus’ position can be found in the work of a later Stoic writer, Posi-
donius. Posidonius’ views – which we know about largely through Ga-
len’s reports in his work The Principles of Plato and Hippocrates – have 
sometimes been regarded as representing a decline from the highpoint of 
Stoicism represented by Chrysippus,21 and it is clear that his views about 
emotions were regarded as unorthodox by later ancient writers.22 But it is 
arguable that this unorthodoxy enables him to consider views that might 
now seem attractive precisely because of their differences from Chrysip-
pean cognitivism.
Any interpretation of Posidonius’ account of the emotions needs 
to address the question of whether the polemical context in which Ga-
len presents it is likely to distort our understanding of his views. So we 
need to say something about that polemical context. In The Principles of 
Hippocrates and Plato, our main source for Posidonius’ views, one of Ga-
len’s primary concerns is with the location of the parts of the human being 
which are responsible for our various mental functions. In reporting Posi-
donius’ views, Galen’s agenda appears to have been to enlist him as an 
21 See for example Rist (1969). 
22 For an explicit statement to this effect see Galen V 463 (de Lacy, p. 339): “Posi-
donius…parted company with Chrysippus and followed Aristotle and Plato to a greater 
extent”.
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ally in arguing against the orthodox Stoic view that the soul was unified, 
and located in the chest, and for what he takes to be the correct, Platonic 
view that the soul has three spatially separated parts. 23
It has sometimes been taken for granted that if Galen says that Posi-
donius advocated a view like Plato’s, involving, in particular, a kind of 
Platonic tripartition into rational, thumetic and epithumetic parts, then 
Posidonius must in fact have done so. However, in recent years a number 
of scholars have suggested that we should be cautious in accepting Galen’s 
interpretation of Posidonius at face-value.24 As Teun Tieleman (2003) has 
pointed out, drawing attention to apparent differences between a school’s 
founder and later writers seems to have been a more or less standard po-
lemical strategy in Hellenistic philosophy. Reports of such differences of-
ten involve exaggeration as well as uncharitable readings of texts. So we 
should consider the evidence carefully.
One significant point which Tieleman notes is that Galen is scrupulous 
enough to tell us that Posidonius talks – like Aristotle – of the soul having 
different powers, not different parts (Tieleman 2003: 34, quoting Galen 
1980: VI 2.5). For Galen at least, talk of different parts brings with it a 
commitment to a spatial separation whereas talk of different powers does 
not (Tieleman 2003: 26ff). It also seems significant that although Galen 
presents us with plenty of evidence to show that Posidonius held that emo-
tions originate somehow in some non-rational aspect of the mind – thus 
perhaps giving ground for distinguishing between rational and irrational 
powers of the mind, he says little that gives any direct evidence that Posi-
donius would have countenanced a further division among non-rational 
powers of the soul corresponding to Plato’s tripartite soul (although he 
does, as we shall see, present Posidonius position in a way which makes it 
tempting to interpret Posidonius along Platonic lines).
Nevertheless, it seems plausible that where Galen appears to be para-
phrasing or quoting directly from Posidonius he does so accurately, even 
if we have ground for thinking he does so tendentiously. If this is correct 
then it seems hard to deny that Posidonius’ position involved the claim 
that emotions depend upon what Galen describes as an “irrational tug” 
(pathetikê holkê). Galen tells us this:
Posidonius censures him [sc. Chrysippus] on these points also, and tries to 
show that the cause of all false suppositions arises (through ignorance in the 
theoretical sphere and in the practical) through the irrational tug.25
23 Tieleman (1996) provides a helpful discussion of the context of Galen’s work.
24 See for example, Cooper (1999), Gill (1999), Graver (2007).
25 Galen (1980: V 442 [de Lacy, p. 321, translation emended. The words in brackets 
correspond to a conjecture by de Lacy]). There is a dispute in the literature as to the sound-
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The “false suppositions” which Posidonius appears to have in mind here 
are the judgments which – on a Stoic view – constitute, or at least partly 
constitute emotions.26
Posidonius’ point appears to be that these judgments do not simply 
spring from nowhere: they need to be explained. It is the “irrational tug” 
that explains them. Galen’s presentation of Posidonius’, position suggests 
that the “irrational tug” is also supposed to explain why we find it natural 
to be attracted to things other than virtue – something which he thinks a 
Stoic ought to find particularly puzzling. Shortly before the passage I have 
already cited he writes:
…it is not surprising that he [ie Chrysippus] was perplexed about the origin 
of vice. He could not state its cause or the ways in which it comes to exist; 
and he could not discover how it is that children err. On all these points, I 
think, it was reasonable for Posidonius to censure and refute him. (Galen 
1980: V 461 [de Lacy, p. 319])
In fact, we should not be surprised to find that the irrational tug should 
have both these roles. As we have seen, for an orthodox Stoic such as 
Chrysippus, false judgments about what is good – hence false moral judg-
ments – are important constituents of emotions. So the role of the “irra-
tional tug” in producing emotions and its role in explaining the origin of 
vice are two sides of the same coin.
Galen links the role that the irrational tug plays in causing mistaken 
judgments about the good to the question of whether animals and young 
children can have emotions, suggesting that it might help to solve the 
problem that the Stoics have in reconciling the apparent existence of emo-
tions in animals and small children with a view on which, on the one 
hand, emotions are equated with judgments, while on the other, neither 
animals nor young children are taken to be capable of making judgments. 
For example, shortly before the passage that I have just cited in which he 
mentions the “irrational tug,” he reminds us that we see children
ness of the text at this point. I follow De Lacy, Kidd and Pohlenz in thinking that there is 
a lacuna in the text, and I accept the emendation suggested by De Lacy. But it should be 
noted that both Fillon-Lahille (1984) and Cooper (1999) deny that there is any need for 
an emendation, with Cooper suggesting that we should see the text as talking only about 
a particular class of false suppositions in this context – namely the ones associated with 
emotion – and saying of them that they are all accounted for by the irrational tug (Cooper 
1999: footnote 37). Even if Cooper is right about this, the point does not materially affect 
the status of this passage as evidence for the claims I make in the text – nothing I say de-
pends on the purely conjectural parts of the text. 
26 False because they involve (what is to a Stoic) the judgment that something present 
at hand, and other than virtue is good or bad.
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angry, kicking, biting, wanting to win, and get the better of their own kind, as 
some animals do when no prize is offered beyond victory itself. Such behav-
ior is clearly observed in quails, cocks, ichneumons, the asp, the crocodile 
and thousands of others.
It is worth noticing here how Galen stresses certain aspects of Posidonius’ 
view which might lead us to equate Galen’s “irrational tug” with what 
Plato calls the thumos, or honour-driven part of the soul. Consider, for 
example, the emphasis in the quotation given above on the way in which 
both children and animals fight, not just to get things that they want but 
also simply for the sake of winning (“when no prize is presented other 
than victory itself”). However, as I have already noted, Galen does not 
present us any evidence that Posidonius saw any reason to make a distinc-
tion between different kinds of irrational tug, along the lines of the distinc-
tion which Plato makes between thumos and epithumia. We should, then, 
be somewhat cautious in attributing a fully-fledged tripartitionist view to 
Posidonius. Fortunately, the case which I am making does not depend on 
the correctness (or indeed the incorrectness) of such an attribution. But we 
should not exaggerate the degree to which this warrants skepticism about 
other things Galen tell us. Unless we regard Galen as an out-and-out liar, 
rather than merely a tendentious over-interpreter of Posidonius’ views, it 
seems hard to deny that Posidonius thought there were a number of phe-
nomena that the orthodox Chrysippean view did not deal well with and 
that his supposition of an “irrational tug” could help to explain them.
Galen’s reports suggest that Posidonius emphasized the role of im-
ages in producing emotions (cf. Sorabji 2000: 14). He quotes Posidonius 
as saying:
For I fancy that you have long observed how men do not experience fear or 
distress when they have been rationally persuaded that an evil is present or 
is approaching, but they do so when they get an image of those same things. 
For how could you stir the irrational by means of reason unless you place 
before it a picture as it were that resembles a picture perceived by the eye. 
(Galen 1980: V 454 [de Lacy, p. 330])
Given the placing of this passage, which occurs several pages after the 
others which I have cited, we should perhaps be cautious about simply 
identifying the images which are mentioned in this passage with the “ir-
rational tug”. On the other hand, unless these images are in some way 
associated with the “irrational tug” we will be presumably be committed 
to thinking that Posidonius thought of the emotions as having two distinct 
kinds of non-rational cause. Without further evidence for such an uneco-
nomical interpretation of Posidonius, we should be wary about accept-
ing it. At any rate one might suppose that it would count in favor of an 
197B. WRINGE: Posidonius on Emotions and Non-Conceptual Content
interpretation of Posidonius’ view that it should say something about the 
relationship between these “images” and the “irrational tug”.
One might also regard it as suggestive that the passage about images 
occurs in close proximity to a discussion of the way that the Posidonian 
account can, but the orthodox Stoic account cannot explain our emotional 
responses to music.27 It is reasonable to think that Posidonius is talk-
ing about the “irrational tug” here, since we are told that he thinks that a 
proper understanding of the cause of emotions will lead us back towards a 
correct, and Platonic, account of the role of music in moral education; so 
there must be some connection between the irrational tug and music. What 
matters here is whether one thinks that Posidonius would have thought 
that music affects us by giving rise to images – a question which should 
perhaps remain open.
V Interpreting Posidonius’ Account
Now that I have sketched the main points of Posidonius’ account – at least 
as Galen presents it to us – we can turn to the question of how it might 
be best understood and whether it does, as Sorabji suggests, represent an 
advance on the standard Stoic view. I shall start by recapping some of the 
main points which the account needs to capture. First, the “tug” needs to 
be something which is capable of existing in both animals and children; 
and also in mature, non-virtuous individuals, where it somehow gives rise 
to mistaken judgments about what is good and bad.  It is also, presum-
ably, something which is capable of being overcome, in the virtuous indi-
vidual. Furthermore, it also involves something which could plausibly be 
regarded as a “faculty” which is distinct from reason, which may involve 
images and which is susceptible to being influenced by music.
One claim which will be important in what follows, and which I think 
the evidence warrants, but which Galen does not inform us about in so 
many words – perhaps because it would not have interested him – is that 
the “irrational tug” should be seen as some kind of intentional state. There 
are two reasons for thinking this. First consider the way in which the “ir-
rational tug” is supposed to account for the emotions of children and ani-
mals (Galen 1980: V 440). These emotions are, presumably, intentional 
states. But they do not – on an orthodox Stoic view, which I take Posidon-
ius to have shared – involve judgments. So their intentionality must derive 
from somewhere else. The most obvious place to take it as deriving from 
is the “irrational tug”. Secondly, the view that emotions are intentional but 
non-conceptual states makes intelligible how such states could give rise to 
27 As Galen (1980) mentions explicitly at V 453 (de Lacy, p. 331).
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judgments in mature thinkers. They do so by presenting the mature thinker 
with certain aspects of their objects in the light of which judgments might 
be made. But states which present objects in a certain light – as for exam-
ple, perception does – are intentional states.
This is not the only account one might give. An alternative would be 
that Posidonius could have viewed emotions as complexes of (intentional) 
judgments and (non-intentional) irrational tugs, with their intentionality 
arising from the fact that the judgment component is intentional. But this 
is a less attractive suggestion for at least two reasons. First, the account 
would be weak in precisely the place that Posidonius seems to have taken 
his account to be superior to Chrysippus’ – namely, in accounting for the 
emotions of children and animals. For on this account the emotions of 
children and animals would not be intentional states, they would simply 
be non-intentional tugs. Secondly, the position simply seems ad hoc: the 
non-intentional “irrational tugs” seem to do no work in the theory other 
than that of being postulated to account for problematic phenomena. (It is 
also worth noticing that if this account was correct there would seem to 
be no reason for thinking that Posidonius’ view was in any way superior 
to the proposals of Nussbaum and Stocker. While this does not show that 
the view canvassed could not have been Posidonius’, it at least gives us 
reasons for giving alternatives to it serious consideration.)
One might nonetheless think that there is a significant problem with 
the suggestion that Posidonius’ irrational tugs are intentional states. For 
one might wonder whether it is possible – either for us, or for someone op-
erating with Posidonius’ assumptions – to make sense of the idea of a kind 
of state which is intentional, but not a fully-fledged judgment. I think there 
is a way in which both we and he could do so. In what follows, I shall start 
by formulating this suggestion in terms drawn from contemporary ana-
lytic philosophy rather than in the sort of terminology which Posidonius 
and his fellow Stoics would have used. Once I have explained the view, I 
will then show how it would fit naturally within the framework of ideas 
which Posidonius would have used. Finally I shall address the question of 
whether the view formulated is one we might now find attractive.
VI Non-Conceptual Content: The Recent Analytic Debate
Put briefly, the suggestion is that Posidonius should have regarded emo-
tions as having an intentional content which is partly non-conceptual. To 
elucidate this claim I need to say what I mean by non-conceptual content, 
and explain why we should think that emotions, or any other kinds of 
states, have contents which are non-conceptual.
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I shall start by saying what it is for a subject to possess a concept. 
Christopher Peacocke has argued that concepts are inferential capacities 
(Peacocke 1992). On his account, to possess a concept is to be disposed to 
find certain kinds of inference “primitively compelling” in virtue of their 
form. An inference is “primitively” compelling just if there are no more 
basic inferences whose compellingness explains the compellingness of the 
inference in question (see Peacocke 1992: chapters 1–2).
It is not obvious that every creature that is capable of being the subject 
of content-bearing states need have any inferential capacities at all. This 
gives us a reason for thinking that there might be same states which have 
non-conceptual content. Creatures which are capable of having intentional 
states but which do not have any inferential abilities would be creatures 
whose mental content had non-conceptual content.
This only raises the possibility of there being mental states with non-
conceptual content. It does not tell us much about what such states might be 
like. We can add more detail by considering Gareth Evans’ (1980) sugges-
tion that for a creature to possess a concept it must meet what is often called 
the Generality Constraint. Here is a rough formulation of this constraint.
A subject possesses the concept F, just in case there is a range of objects a, 
b. c… such that the subject is capable of entertaining all of the thoughts Fa 
Fb Fc…
In this form, the constraint talks about subjects’ possession of concepts, 
but does not say anything about what sorts of states are to be regarded as 
involving concepts. However, it is not too hard to develop Evans’ point in 
a way which does so. We can take concepts to be states which are capable 
of entering into an indefinite range of combinations, and saying that a 
state has a conceptual content is to say that it can be regarded as involving 
parts or sub-states that have this capacity for combination. Saying that a 
content-bearing state has a kind of state which is non-conceptual, by con-
trast, is to say that it has content in a way which does not require that it be 
composed of recombinable substates.28
28 One might be curious about the relationship between Peacocke’s suggestion that 
concepts are inferential capacities and Evans’ claim that in order to count as being concep-
tual, a thinker’s states must satisfy the Generality Constraint. Couldn’t there be thinkers 
who had extremely localised inferential abilities – so that they counted as concept posses-
sors without satisfying this constraint? The answer to this is no. For on Peacocke’s view, 
possession of a concept involves finding certain inferences in which that concept figures 
compelling in virtue of their form. To do this one has to appreciate that certain inferences 
involving a concept instantiate a particular form. But it is plausible that one can only do so 
if one appreciates that the concept is one that could conceivably apply to a range of diffe-
rent objects. But to appreciate this just is to satisfy the Generality Constraint. 
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This provides us with an abstract characterisation of what it is for a 
state to have non-conceptual content. However, it does not provide us with 
any reason for thinking that there are any such states. So why should we 
think that there are?
A number of authors have argued that perceptual states have non-
conceptual content.29 For reasons of space, I shall concentrate on one line 
of argument put forward by Tim Crane (1991), which involves reflecting 
on the ways in which the content of perception appears to be inferentially 
isolated from central cognition. This line of argument seems especially 
significant in the current context, since there appear to be clear parallels 
between the way in which perception is independent of central cognition 
and the way which (as Posidonius tells us) the emotions are sometimes in 
conflict with (and thus not under the control of) reason.30
The fact that perception is sometimes independent of central cogni-
tion is illustrated by the fact that when presented with instances of the 
well-known Müller-Lyer illusion, we typically see the two horizontal lines 
as having different lengths, even if we know that they are in fact the same 
length. Crane argues that facts of this sort show that even if we regard 
perceptual states as having components we should not see them as infer-
entially relevant components, and hence as conceptual.
It is worth noticing that there is a significant analogy between the 
point which Crane makes about the inferential isolation of perceptual 
states, and a point that one might make about emotions. Consider again 
Michael Stocker’s case of the arachnophobe who knows that spiders pose 
him no danger, but nevertheless remains afraid, discussed in section II. It 
is natural to compare the persistence of the arachnophobe’s fear in the face 
of countervailing belief with the persistent appearance of the liens of the 
Müller-Lyer illusion as having different lengths.31
Paul Griffiths (1997) has argued that this is not simply an isolated 
case: something similar is true of some of the representations involved in 
certain emotions – those which are known by Ekman and others a as “ba-
sic emotions”. If Crane’s argument succeeds in showing that perceptual 
states have non-conceptual contents it should show something similar for 
this kind of emotional state.
But one might have doubts. Might there not be states which are in-
ferentially isolated, but nonetheless conceptual? Consider beliefs in the 
Freudian unconscious. One might take such beliefs to be inferentially iso-
29 Peacocke (1992), Martin (1992), Crane (1991). 
30 For further arguments for the same conclusion see Heck (2007).
31 See also Tappolet (2000), Döring (2009).
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lated. They are, after all, repressed, and one might take the fact they are 
repressed to mean that they cannot figure in inferences – or at least not in 
conscious inferences. Might they, nonetheless, still be conceptual repre-
sentations?32
This objection does not seem especially compelling. Even if one is 
not skeptical about the status of claims about the existence of the Freud-
ian unconscious, it is not obvious why one should take such unconscious 
beliefs to be conceptual states. If one does, it will presumably because one 
is impressed by the way that such states can interact with other states on 
the basis of their content to give rise to such things as revealing slips of 
the tongue, wish-fulfillment dreams and the like. To the extent that this 
is true, it seems odd to think of these states as being wholly inferentially 
isolated.
We should also note at this point that there are reasons other than 
Crane’s for believing that perceptual states can have non-conceptual 
content. I mention these last two arguments for the sake of comprehen-
siveness.33 Unlike Crane’s argument, there is no obvious parallel to them 
in anything Posidonius says about emotion. Some, but not all, of them 
seem to generalize from the case of perception to that of emotion. So, 
for example, claims that perceptual content needs to be non-conceptual 
in order to explain how reference can be experientially grounded seem 
unlikely to have analogues which generate similar conclusions for emo-
tions. On the other hand arguments which are based on the existence of 
perceptual states whose character is too fine-grained to be captured by 
anything one has a concept of do seem to have such analogues (Peacocke 
1986).
The same is true of arguments based on the possibility of remembering 
being in a perceptual state whose correct characterization involves the pos-
session of concepts which one did not possess at the time, but which one 
now has. For example, suppose one remembers the ovoid shape of a rugby 
ball one saw when one was a very young child (Martin 1992). The fact that 
there is a memory there at all suggest that we have some kind of represen-
tation. Nevertheless it might be that when we formed the memory we did 
not have the concept ovoid. If so, the concept cannot have been involved in 
that initial representation. Nevertheless it seems that one might legitimately 
say that one remembers the ovoid shape of the ball. If so, this will be a case 
of non-conceptual perceptual content. There seem to be obvious parallels 
in the emotional sphere: imagine learning the term “schadenfreude”, and 
32 This point was raısed by an anonymous referee for Prolegomena
33 And at the urging of an anonymous referee for Prolegomena, whom I thank.
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immediately recognizing that it applies to an experience which one knows 
but did not previously have any way of articulating.
VII Non-Conceptual Content in Posidonius
In the previous section I have tried to explain why someone might think 
that some sorts of states have non-conceptual content, and why emotions 
might be among those states. But why attribute a view of this sort to Posi-
donius?
There are two main reasons. The first is that the aspect of Posidonius’ 
view of which we can be most confident is his view that emotions do not 
(contra Chrysippus) belong to our logistikê, or rational faculty. Galen re-
peatedly asserts that this was his view,34 and it seems to be part of the point 
of insisting that animals and young children, who do not, on Stoic views, 
have a logistikê nevertheless have emotions.35 Saying this seems to entail 
that having emotions does not require the possession of general concepts: 
again, it is part of Stoic orthodoxy that one can only have general concepts 
if one has a logistikê, and that animals and young children do not.36
However, we should not attribute to Posidonius the view that emo-
tions are not intentional. On a view like this Posidonius’ view would mark 
a step back into intellectual darkness, rather than an advance on Chry-
sippus’ position. However implausible that position might be, one of its 
strengths is precisely that it does accommodate the intentionality of emo-
tion.
Furthermore, there are good reasons for denying that Posidonius’ 
view could have represented such a backward step. For although Posido-
nius holds that our emotions do not belong to our logistikê, he also thinks 
that in a virtuous individual they will still be subject to the logistikê (Galen 
1980: V 446). But for an emotion to be capable of being overcome by lo-
gistikê, it must have some sort of intentional content. It is hard to see what 
could be meant by suggesting that something that was merely a bodily dis-
turbance could be mastered by reason. We can make sense of the idea of 
the logistikê being either troubled or untroubled by such disturbances – we 
might talk of someone as overcoming pains in this way. But this is not the 
way in which our emotions are supposed to be mastered on the Stoic view. 
They are mastered by being shown to have a mistaken representational 
34 Most obviously at Galen (1980: V 443 and V 453).
35 See Galen (1980: V 431 [de Lacy, p. 295]): “Posidonius…was ashamed to defend 
the doctrine of the other Stoics that…since the affections belong to the reasoning part of 
the soul irrational animals have no share in them and children do not share in them either 
because obviously children too are not rational”.
36 As the passage form Galen cited in the previous footnote suggests.
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content. And this is only possible if they have a content: in other words, if 
they are representational states.37
We might wonder whether Stoics – or any ancient thinkers – can re-
ally allow for the existence of states which are intentional without being 
conceptually informed. However, the evidence seems to be clear that this 
was not a view which was unheard of in ancient times. Aristotle allows 
for such a position when he argues that animals should be seen as having 
appearances rather than beliefs, precisely on the grounds that we have to 
see them as having representational states of some sort in order to explain 
their behaviour, but that they cannot be seen as having general concepts. 
And the evidence seems to be that the Stoics followed Aristotle at this 
point (see Sorabji 1996).
Still we might ask at this point why Posidonius does not speak of the 
irrational tug as involving appearances, if this is the sort of view he has in 
mind. To this there seem to be two answers. First, we cannot be entirely 
sure that he did not: the most we can say is that Galen does not report him 
as having done so.38 Given Galen’s own agenda, it is possible that the 
point did not strike him as one worth reporting. Secondly, to some extent 
the objection misses the point I am making. I am not saying that Posido-
nius held that emotions involved appearances rather than judgments: all I 
am saying is that it was open to him to hold that emotions involved a spe-
cies of representation that were like appearances in being intentional but 
not conceptually informed.
VIII The Attractions of the Posidonian View
Richard Sorabji (2000: 58–9 and passim) has argued that Posidonius’ 
view of the emotions is preferable both to its Chrysippean predecessor 
37 Supposing that Galen was right to claim that Posidonius held – like Plato in the 
Republic – that the soul has three parts, one might advance a further argument. If we deny 
that states belonging to the emotional part of our soul are correctly characterised as inten-
tional states, on the grounds that a Stoic can make no room for the idea of states which are 
intentional without being conceptually informed, then it may be unclear why Posidonius 
could have been committed to a tripartite rather than a bipartite model of the soul. Platonic 
arguments for the tripartition of the soul certainly seem to require that each part has states 
with intentional contents – if they did not, then they would not be able to come into conflict 
with one another in the way that the tripartite hypothesis is originally invoked to explain 
in the Republic. But the point is not unanswerable: I have already noted the case for being 
skeptical about Galen’s report that Posidonius was a tri-partitionist (p. 196 supra). In any 
case, it is possible that Posidonius might have based his case for the tripartition of the soul 
on the suggestion that the different parts had different physiological underpinnings. Galen 
himself certainly seems to have held such a view. 
38 It is suggestive, though not conclusive, that Posidonius does speak of emotions as 
involving images: Galen (1980: V 454 [de Lacy, p. 331]). See pp. 196–197 supra.
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and to many forms of contemporary cognitivism on a number of differ-
ent grounds. While my interpretation goes beyond his in suggesting that 
the contemporary analytic notion of non-conceptual content illuminates 
Posidonius’ account, I endorse the high regard he has for Posidonius. It 
seems as though Posidonius’ views retain what is attractive in the Chry-
sippean conception, while giving a more plausible account of such phe-
nomena as the attribution of emotions to animals and young children; the 
role that music can play in arousing emotion and the question of how we 
could have emotions that were in conflict with our better judgments – as in 
Stocker’s case of the arachnophobe (Sorabji 2000: 125–7; 85–6; 132).
Sorabji also suggests that Posidonius’ account can help us to give a 
plausible account of cases where our emotions seem to be less than those 
which our judgments would seem on the Chrysippean view to demand – for 
example, the case which Sorabji mentions of lack of emotional response 
due to inattention or exhaustion: again I agree (Sorabji 2000: 115). Central 
to the explanation of these cases will be the idea that conceptualized judg-
ments can come apart from unconceptualised element in emotion; just as 
perception can come apart form the judgments to which it standardly gives 
rise. The view compares favorably with the alternative put forward by Nuss-
baum, and discussed above, that here we have a case of the more common 
phenomenon of conflicting judgments. That view might intially seem more 
promising, despite my earlier suggestion that it is ad hoc. But Posidonius 
suggests that there is a further problem with it – namely that an adequate 
theory will not merely postulate a conflicting judgment at this point but will 
give some explanation of its source (Galen 1980: V 454 [de Lacy, p. 331]). 
The idea of an irrational tug provides us with such an explanation.
One might worry that this is too quick. Following Sorabji and Grif-
fiths, I have made much of the criticism that contemporary cognitivist are 
not explicit about the content of the judgments that are supposed to be 
involved in emotions (Sorabji 1999, 2000). One might worry that Posido-
nius’ view was inferior to Chrysippus’ because of just such considerations. 
However, the advocate of the position that I am defending has a good 
rejoinder at this point. It seems fair to ask the cognitivist to state explicitly 
which judgments are involved in emotions is that our judgments ought, 
in principle, to be articulable. But it is not so obvious that the contents of 
non-conceptual representations need be transparent to us in the same way. 
Indeed there is no guarantee that any particular individual has a suffi-
ciently rich conceptual repertoire for us to be able to articulate the content 
of those emotions precisely in every case.39
39 Perhaps they would be capable of being so articulated by a Stoic sage. But such 
individuals are, in the stock phrase, rarer than the Phoenix.
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IX Two Qualifications
I have argued that Posidonius should be seen as holding that emotions 
sometimes involve representational states with non-conceptual content. 
However, I am not claiming that he would have held that all the states we 
would classify as emotions involve states with non-conceptual content. 
Nor would he need to have held that in the case of those states in which 
non-conceptual representations are implicated, the emotion consists only 
of such states.
Start with the first qualification. Stoic writers do not, of course, speak 
about emotions – they speak about pathê. It is far from clear whether “emo-
tion” is a fully adequate translation of pathos. Stoics saw pathê as being, 
literally, pathological: something which we would be better off without, 
and something which the virtuous agent or sage would not be subject to.40 
However, it does not follow from this that we have to see the Stoic sage 
as an emotionless robot.41 Stoic sages are characterised as being subject 
to what the Stoics call eupatheiai which differ from pathê in two respects: 
they are not disturbing, and they are not based as are pathê on false beliefs 
about what is good for us.
The fact that the Stoics make a distinction of this kind might lead us 
to want to translate pathos not as “emotion” but as “disturbing emotion”. 
This leaves room for us to allow that eupatheiai are emotions too, and 
hence that the Stoic sage is not emotionless. Points of translation aside, 
the significance of this for the current topic is that, while, if I am correct, 
Posidonius would have had good reasons for thinking that pathê have non-
conceptual content, it isn’t at all clear that he would have had to say the 
same about eupatheiai. For the argument for thinking that pathê have to 
have non-conceptual content depends on the idea that in order to account 
for our being subject to pathê at all we have to postulate an irrational tug. 
In the case of eupatheiai it is not clear that anything similar is involved.
We should not overstate the significance of this. Posidonius also 
holds that in order to have a chance of becoming virtuous we need to have 
the emotional part of our soul educated in the right way with music and 
gymnastic training (Galen 1980: V 446 [de Lacy, p. 327]). We could take 
this insistence in one of two ways. One interpretation would be that we 
need to do this in order to make the part of our soul which supplies us with 
the representations involved in pathê inactive. A second possibility is that 
properly trained, this part of the soul will provide us with non-misleading 
representations which are capable of being transformed by reason into 
40 As Frede (1986) emphasises.
41 See Frede (1986), Irwin (1999).
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eupatheia. We probably don’t have enough evidence about Posidonius’ 
views to know which interpretation is correct here. However, if it is the 
second, then it seems as though even in the case of eupatheiai we will 
have some non-conceptual representations.
The second qualification is as important as the first. I have argued 
that Posidonius ought to see pathê as involving non-conceptual represen-
tations. But I have not argued for the stronger claim that all of the repre-
sentations involved in pathê are non-conceptual. The view that pathê in 
mature human beings involve only non-conceptual representations does 
not seem particularly plausible. Nothing that Posidonius is reported as 
saying directly commits him to this view, and some of the views he holds 
seem to conflict with it. So interpretative charity suggests that we should 
not attribute the view to him. Instead, we should take his view to be that 
in mature human beings, pathê typically involve a mixture of representa-
tions, some of which are conceptual and some of which are not.
Consider an emotion such as anger – something which most of us are 
subject to on some occasions, and which would certainly count as a pathos 
for Posidonius. On Posidonius’ Platonic account we will have a tendency 
to be subject to this emotion insofar as we have not received the right sort 
of musical and gymnastic education to ensure that we are not supplied with 
recalcitrant representations to the effect that we have been injured and that 
an appropriate response would be to harm the person who has injured us. 
But even those of us who are in this unfortunate state – that is to say, most 
of us – need not be overpowered by this emotion. One way in which we 
can prevent ourselves from being so overpowered is by reflecting on our 
anger and on whether it is justified. True, this will not always be effective, 
and it may still leave us feeling angry. But it may nonetheless mitigate our 
anger – at least to the extent of preventing us from acting on it.
Now consider how we are to distinguish between the three cases of 
the person who does not become angry at all, the person who masters 
their anger by reflecting on it (but still feels angry), and the person who 
does not attempt to master their anger, or who ends up endorsing their 
non-conceptual representations. In the first case we can say that they have 
none of the representations, either conceptual or non-conceptual, which 
are characteristic of anger. To distinguish between the second and third 
cases we are likely to want to say that one of them has some representa-
tions that the other lacks. So this suggests that there are two different sorts 
of representation here – one of which gets removed by reflection, and one 
of which does not. But it is hard to see how non-conceptual representa-
tions can be got rid of by reflection. Part of the original characterisation of 
these representations was supposed to be that they were not penetrable by 
inference. (Consider the analogy with the Müller-Lyer illusion: we cannot 
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reason ourselves out of seeing one set of lines as being longer than the oth-
ers, but we can refuse to endorse a belief or conceptual representation to 
that effect.) So we have to conclude that the difference between the person 
who masters their anger and the person who does not must lie at the level 
of their conceptual representations. But this forces us to say that anger – in 
the case of someone who is capable of reflecting on it rationally – must 
involve some conceptual representations.
So much for a defense of the claim that pathê in mature human be-
ings will typically involve both conceptual and non-conceptual represen-
tations. Would Posidonius be in a position to endorse this defense? The 
answer seems to be that he would. The only reason for not doing so would 
be if he denied that – for a non-sage, or someone who has not received the 
right kind of education – reason can even help us to master our emotions. 
And if he had thought this, it would have left him so far from the orthodox 
Stoic view (as represented by Chrysippus) that it is highly unlikely that 
Galen, who loved to show up divisions between the Stoics, would not 
have said something about it.
X Some Objections Addressed
I have argued that Posidonius should be interpreted as having held a view 
on which emotions involve representations with non-conceptual contents. 
I have also argued that Posidonius’ view – as I understand it – has much 
to be said for it. In doing so, I have drawn heavily on recent work on the 
role of non-conceptual content in perception. However, the view that per-
ception has a content which is partly non-conceptual is controversial. It is 
worth considering whether objections to the idea that perceptual content 
has a non-conceptual aspect undermine (what I take to be) the Posidonian 
view. I shall argue that they do not.
It will be helpful to start by rehearsing a distinction, due to Christopher 
Peacocke, between two different kinds of non-conceptual content which 
seem to be involved in perception: “scenario content” and “proto-propo-
sitional content” (Peacocke 1992: chapter 3). The distinction is important, 
because I shall be arguing that if it is plausible to think that emotions do 
involve non-conceptual content, then the kind of non-conceptual content 
which they involve is proto-propositional content. By contrast, many of 
the most frequently rehearsed objections to the idea of non-conceptual 
content seem to be objections to the existence of something like Pea-
cocke’s “scenario content”.
Peacocke characterizes the scenario content of a perceptual state as 
a positioned three dimensional colored mosaic centered on the subject of 
the experience. He argues that we should see scenario content as involv-
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ing non-conceptual content because an accurate characterization of that 
mosaic may well involve reference to shapes and shades of colors which 
do not fall within the conceptual repertoire of the individual whose states 
they are.
However, Peacocke argues that scenario content cannot exhaust the 
non-conceptual content of perception, because there are mosaics which 
might be seen in one of two ways by a subject. For example, a mosaic 
containing a square with one corner at the top may be seen in two differ-
ent ways. In one the square is seen as a square – that is to say, as a shape 
with four equal sides meeting one another at right angles; in the second as 
an equiangular rhombus – a shape with two pairs of parallel sides meeting 
one another at the same angle. Furthermore, if – as Peacocke thinks, and 
as I have accepted in this paper – having a concept involves having an in-
ferential capacity, then seeing the shapes these ways need not require one 
to have the concepts of square and rhombus in one’s conceptual repertoire. 
For there is no reason to think that someone whose experience takes the 
forms described here need be capable of any inferences at all. So there are 
perceptual experiences which involve a kind of non-conceptual content 
which is not scenario content. This is what Peacocke calls “protoproposi-
tional content.”
Peacocke’s example suggests that unlike scenario content, proto-
propositional content is only contingently non-conceptual. In other words, 
if there is such a thing as the proto-propositional content of a perceptual 
state, it is the kind of thing which is at least in principle expressible in 
propositional form – provided that the subject is sufficiently conceptu-
ally adept. (The perceptual content is still non-conceptual because having 
that particular experience does not require one to be adept in the way that 
would be necessary to express the concept involved.) By contrast, it is not 
clear that the scenario content involved in any given perceptual experience 
could be fully articulated in conceptual form.
If Peacocke’s argument for the existence of proto-propositional non-
conceptual content it correct, then it is plausible that we have at least the 
possibility of such content whenever a subject has an experience which 
could be interpreted in conceptual form in one of two ways and that dif-
ference can be represented in perception. One might think that emotion-
laden cases of perceptual experiences provide further instances where this 
notion is applicable. Thus, it seems plausible that a certain gesture made 
by another person might be seen, as being either threatening or neutral, in 
such a way that whether it is seen one way or another can correctly be said 
to involve an aspect of the experience of the gesture. Furthermore, some-
one might be capable of having either kind of experience even when they 
did not have the sorts of inferential capacities which would be required in 
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order for an attribution of the concept of a threat to them to be correct. (An 
animal or a young child might flinch from a threat; and the fear that lead 
them to do so plausibly has a content which is both intentional and has an 
experiential aspect to it but need not – if the arguments of this paper are 
correct – require the possession of a concept of threat or of danger.)
These points suggest that – at least as far as Posidonius is concerned – 
the non-conceptual content of emotions should be seen as being analogous 
to proto-propositional content rather than scenario content. For, as I have 
already suggested, Posidonius would presumably be well-advised to hold 
that the non-conceptual content of emotions was, as it were, homogene-
ous with the contents of judgment. If the “irrational tug” provides us with 
judgments which are conceptualisable but not actually conceptualized, we 
can see how they could be the sorts of thing which were, in principle, cor-
rectible by reason – as a Stoic should presumably take them to be.
Seeing the non-conceptual content of emotions in this way also has 
advantages from the point of view of contemporary debate, since it allows 
us to bypass a number of possible objections. For example, in a famous 
discussion of non-conceptual content, McDowell suggests that arguments 
for non-conceptual content which are based on the idea that our experi-
ence represents more differences than could plausibly be captured in our 
experience fail because we can see those features of our experience as 
falling under indexical recognitional concepts such as “that shape” and 
“that colour” (McDowell 1994: lecture 3). McDowell’s claims have at-
tracted considerable skepticism.42 But we need not discuss whether or not 
this skepticism is deserved, since this argument seems to be aimed against 
reasons for believing in scenario content rather than against the possibility 
of proto-propositional content. 
A second objection to the idea that non-conceptual content plays a 
role in perception is based on the alleged role which experience plays 
in justifying our beliefs. McDowell (1994) and Brewer (1999) have both 
argued that states that are not conceptualised cannot function as reasons 
– and that if we do not see perceptual experiences as providing reasons for 
our beliefs we cut ourselves off from the possibility of holding that our 
beliefs are “answerable” to the world. This line of argument does not seem 
to undermine the position that I am arguing for. The idea that non-concep-
tual emotional representations need to function as reasons is one that is 
considerably less compelling than the thought that perceptual experiences 
must do so. But even if it was compelling it need not present a problem 
here. For there do not seem to be strong reasons thinking that a state which 
42 For one expression of which see Dokic and Pacherie (2001).
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is non-conceptual, but conceptualisable could not play a reason-providing 
role (cf. Heck 2000). Furthermore, this view is compatible with the idea 
that sometimes the emotions of mature human beings do give them non-
derivative and non-belief dependent reasons of at least one sort – namely, 
reasons for action, because, on the account which I have offered, the emo-
tions of mature human beings can also include conceptualised representa-
tions – and there is no reason why these representations cannot constitute 
reasons for action.43 44
XI Conclusion
In the central sections of this paper, I set out a view of emotions (or at least 
pathê) as involving, but not being completely constituted by non-concep-
tual representations. I also tried to make a case for thinking that a view like 
this was available to, and could have been endorsed by Posidonius. I have 
not claimed that he actually endorsed such a view: there is no direct evi-
dence for this. But the arguments that he is reported as having put forward 
would certainly support such a view better than any other that was avail-
able to him. So, if he had a coherent view (which, of course, we cannot be 
sure of) it is likely to have been this.
However, I have tried not only to provide an interpretation of Posi-
donius’ position, but to argue that such a view should be attractive to con-
temporary philosophers. My reasons for thinking this should already be 
apparent: here I shall just try to summarise them. The view that I have 
outlined has many of the advantages of mainstream cognitive theories of 
emotions: it agrees with them that emotions are intentional states and can 
stand in rational relationships with other kinds of mental states. However, 
it also accommodates some points which mainstream cognitivist views 
seem to have difficulty with. In particular it can easily allow for the fact 
that animals and young children have emotions. It can also explain how 
we can have emotions which run counter to our explicit beliefs. This is 
possible because we can have a non-conceptual representation whose con-
tent contradicts the content of our conceptual representations.
Furthermore, unlike some of the contemporary cognitivist accounts 
which I criticised at the beginning of this paper, the position that I am dis-
cussing can accommodate these points in a way that does not seem ad hoc. 
The claim that we have non-conceptual representations as well as concep-
tual ones, and that these representations are implicated in standard cases 
43 Assuming, contra Dancy (2000), that mental states are the right sorts of things to 
be reasons.
44 For an argument which has this thought as its conclusion see Döring (2003).
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of emotions are based on general theoretical considerations and not just on 
a need to deal with perceived counter-examples to a particular version of 
cognitivism. We need to specify that a particular kind of non-conceptual 
content is involved – namely proto-propositional; but again, the existence 
of non-conceptual content of this sort can be motivated on other grounds.
In short, the view that emotions have non-conceptual contents is one 
which is remarkably plausible. It is also prefigured to a striking degree 
in Posidonius’ writings – or at least those reports of them which have 
come down to us from Galen. We would do well to appropriate Posidon-
ius’ views.
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